

27 FEB 1961

**THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1960**

I. The Roots of the Chinese Position

1. When Khrushchev rose to power on a program promising de-Stalinization and liberalization of the regime, centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe began to endanger the cohesion of the bloc. National Communism of the Yugoslav variety asserted itself in Hungary and Poland, only to be bloodily repressed or neutralized through arms or pressure by the Soviet Union. Today the Chinese Communist resistance to the Soviet Union -- a resistance amounting at times to open defiance -- is essentially akin to the fermentation of national Communism in Eastern Europe. The difference in the case of the Chinese Communists is that their outlook is fundamentalist, whereas the Eastern European movements were revisionist. The common denominator of both forms of opposition, however, is the objection to Soviet hegemony within the bloc and the international Communist movement, and to the practices of Soviet hegemony in the fields of ideology, policy making, and policy coordination. Although Soviet hegemonistic practices are no longer as crude as they were under

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Stalin, national and racial pride may render Chinese national Communism particularly sensitive to encroachments. The Chinese Communists themselves claim that the conflict began when Khrushchev rose to power and attempted to impose his views and international policies on world Communism. Their case against the CPSU and Khrushchev is based on the charge that their objections to the Khrushchev program have not been heard, that they have no voice in the policy-making process although they are the second largest Communist power. At the October-November 1960 meetings in Moscow, Khrushchev and the CPSU, in control of the majority of the Communist parties in the bloc and in the free world, attempted to overcome the objections of the Chinese by imposing majority rule on them. This maneuver did not succeed.

II. The Evolution of the Chinese Position

2. The Chinese have insisted that, contrary to Soviet accusations, they have always sought to resolve their differences with the CPSU through bilateral consultation. We know that they did make their views known on a number of crucial questions (Poland, Hungary, the Suez crisis) to the

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CPSU during 1956, and that the CPSU, at least nominally, sought Chinese concurrence on such matters as the anti-Stalin campaign. But it is equally clear that the Chinese were ever more critical of Soviet unilateral actions until November 1957. At that time they achieved what they considered a real bilateral consultation through Mao's visit to Moscow and the joint Sino-Soviet drafting of the 1957 Moscow Declaration. Since then, they assert, the Soviets have unilaterally abandoned the common positions of this declaration.

3. In 1958 the CPC felt free to demonstrate publicly its autonomy (at least on domestic policy) when it launched the communes and the "great leap forward" program. Both in 1958 and 1959 consultations between Mao and Khrushchev were considered unsatisfactory by the Chinese. Chinese moves to re-open the border question with India, which began in mid-1958, were also proof that in the Chinese opinion this autonomy applied in the foreign policy field as well. By mid-1959 Chinese representatives in the decision-making bodies of the international Communist front organizations were opposing Soviet initiatives, challenging Soviet control of both personnel and policy, and refusing to cooperate in reaching urgently required policy decisions.

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4. At the beginning of 1960 the Chinese made public declaration of their autonomy in foreign policy, both in a statement by the party's Central Committee and in a speech (4 February) by K'ang Sheng to the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states. In April 1960 the Chinese gave clear public statement of their ideological dissent by publishing and circulating to Communist parties throughout the world a summation of their ideological views in the book "Long Live Leninism." In June 1960, at the meeting of the Executive Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking, the Chinese went from public dissent to public criticism of the CPSU.

5. At the special meeting of Communist parties convened in Bucharest later in June, the Chinese made explicit their fundamental opposition to the CPSU domination of the international Communist movement, and thereupon launched their attack upon Khrushchev as the head of the CPSU. Surprised in Bucharest by the hastily organized Soviet counterattack, and provoked by punitive measures taken against them by the CPSU in July and August, the Chinese in their letter to the CPSU of 10 September codified their challenge to Soviet hegemony

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and to the methods used to enforce it. This document was clearly the first move in the Chinese campaign to exploit the coming October and November meetings, agreed upon at Bucharest, for an all-out challenge to the position of the CPSU within the international Communist movement.

III. The Chinese Case Against the Hegemony of the CPSU and the USSR

6. The essence of the Chinese case as presented at Moscow is embodied in two charges: first, the USSR had sought to infringe upon Chinese national or state sovereignty; second, the CPSU had infringed upon the political and ideological sovereignty of the CPC.

7. Under the first title the Chinese stated that the USSR had demanded the formation of a joint fleet under Soviet command in the Pacific, had sought to establish naval bases in China, had insisted on the establishment of radar stations in China under Soviet command; and had proposed the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet stock company to construct and manage a long-wave radio transmitter in China. The Chinese, furthermore, rejected as pressure the Soviet criticisms of the Chinese domestic policy on the great leap forward and the communes.

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saying that, while they did not ask for approval of such programs, they denied that any outsider had the right to criticize them. Such criticism, they said, was unwarranted intervention in Chinese internal affairs. The Chinese also rejected Khrushchev's insistence that Soviet scientific planning methods were necessary for China, saying that they were determined to go ahead through their own efforts and that international cooperation on a voluntary basis would be feasible only when their own efforts had achieved their ends. The Chinese spokesman specified that the CPSU considered this Chinese position a "nationalist deviation."

8. Under this first title the Chinese, with valuable Albanian support, also charged infringement of their sovereignty by Soviet efforts to use state-to-state relationships for coercive purposes. In these terms they condemned the Soviets for violating treaties and agreements, using their economic power coercively, and fabricating issues to gain political advantage. The Chinese also charged that the CPSU had used the same methods against the Albanians, and the presentation by the Albanians of

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their own case showed that the Chinese had informed them of statements made by Soviet officials on the matter. Hoxha charged that the CPSU had sought to subvert and mobilize specific Albanian party leaders against the Chinese, that the Soviet ambassador had interfered in Albanian foreign affairs, and that the Soviets had tried to provoke Albanian military leaders to act against their government. Hoxha said the USSR had reduced grain deliveries drastically in September and October 1960 during a time of famine and, further, that the Soviet marshals Malinovsky and Grechko had refused to give "certain arms" to the Albanian forces and had been threatening, while the November conferences were in session, to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact. Hoxha dramatized his charges by saying that Khrushchev himself had told the Chinese on 6 November that the Soviets would employ the same methods against Albania that they had used against Yugoslavia and had contemptuously said that the USSR had lost an Albanian ally while the Chinese had gained one.

9. Detailing infringements of the political and ideological sovereignty of the CPC, the Chinese first pointed to the specific efforts of the CPSU to impose its views and decisions on China and the international Communist

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movement. In particular they charged that the CPSU had attempted to impose the decisions of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses upon the international Communist movement without any prior consultations. But the Chinese also devoted much time to stating the positive side of their case, which centered in the thesis that "consultation between equals" was the only proper method of achieving and insuring unity within the international Communist movement. They pointed to the Moscow Declaration of 1957 as the good and proper precedent since it was arrived at through real consultation and a joint drafting effort and since it covered only those points upon which there was agreement. Contrasting these good and bad precedents, the Chinese charged that the CPSU had in fact de-emphasized and virtually ignored the policies agreed upon and embodied in the 1957 declaration, and had instead pressured the movement into conforming to the decisions of its own congresses.

10. Developing their argument, the Chinese emphasized that they had been willing to consult with the CPSU after the November 1957 meeting in an attempt to iron out the remaining differences. They also said they were willing to do the same thing after the November 1960 meeting. They

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stated that they sought no special privileges and that sincere consultation was the true expression of the equality between parties. They made it clear that for them there were two conditions for unity. First, rejecting the Soviet insistence that they approve majority decisions, they asked for an acknowledgment by the movement of their right of assent. This they spelled out by insisting upon the need for unanimous decisions. Second, they affirmed that they also had the right of dissent. This they embodied in their demand that at conferences unresolved questions be carried over for future consideration rather than be made the subject of pressure and "crusades" organized by one party against another. On the basis of sovereignty the Chinese rebuffed the Soviet attempts to attack the "Sinification" of Marxism-Leninism by Mao as an expression of nationalism. Not only did they declare at Moscow that it was their sovereign right to determine how Marxism-Leninism was to be applied within China; their late 1960 campaign demanding that all Chinese accept Mao's "world outlook" showed their determination to assert their autonomy in foreign affairs as well.

11. In attacking the CPSU for imposing its views on the international Communist movement, the Chinese first sought to prove the fallibility of

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the CPSU, to show that it had no right to impose its views. Further, by proving that the CPSU used improper methods and pressures, the Chinese sought to invalidate the CPSU claim to moral superiority, objectivity, or adherence to high principles in its dealings with other parties. The case against the infallibility of the CPSU was presented mainly in the form of a three-pronged attack against Khrushchev's personal infallibility as an interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, as a maker of international policy, and as a Communist activist at the diplomatic level.

12. The Chinese desire to discredit Khrushchev in the ideological field is one of the main reasons why their case against the CPSU depended heavily upon ideological argumentation. Their use of this approach tends to overshadow their positions on other matters, which are more easily recognizable as manifestations of national Communism. The attack on Khrushchev as a policy maker justified the Chinese attention to what the Soviets called the "old issues"--Stalin, Hungary, and Poland. The Albanian case, of obvious topical interest, reinforced this Chinese approach dramatically. The very fact that Hoxha was able to present his accusations with impunity was itself a proof that the CPSU under Khrushchev's

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leadership had clearly failed to achieve its objectives in Albania. The detailed critical treatment the Chinese gave to Khrushchev's performance as a diplomat was intended to round out the case against him by showing his incompetence as an activist. A particularly shrewd device employed by the Chinese in this presentation was the description of the way the French Communist Party had been obliged to scold its members for their display of undue enthusiasm at the time of Eisenhower's visit to Paris. It made clear to free world parties how Soviet maneuvers and mistakes could force them into difficult positions and create internal disciplinary problems for them.

13. In attacking the infallibility of Khrushchev as a maker of international policy, the Chinese first returned to the denigration of Stalin. The Chinese charged that Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 had been improperly carried out and was devoid of a proper Marxist analysis of Stalin's actions; they declared also that it had provided ammunition to the enemy. The Chinese spokesman in November 1960 declared that, although the CPC had endorsed the criticism of Stalin, it had never agreed with the way

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the attack was carried out. Hoxha went even further and blamed the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 on the manner in which Stalin was exposed. Khrushchev protested that the Chinese leaders and other bloc leaders including Hoxha had approved the anti-Stalin campaign in advance. The Chinese denied this. They asserted further that the attack on the cult of personality had been carried too far by the CPSU, for, they said, Communist parties needed personal leaders and it was improper to condemn the rightful honoring of influential persons. The head of at least one European Communist party, De Groot of the Netherlands CP, echoed this Chinese sentiment.

14. The Chinese next charged that the Soviet Union had intended at the end of October 1956 to withdraw their forces from Hungary and that they had protested this move. Since their audience was fully aware of the impact of the military intervention decided upon on 4 November 1956, the import of this Chinese charge was clear. Again, Hoxha carried this charge of Soviet failure even further when he said that the causes of the Hungarian debacle lay in the fact that Khrushchev and Suslov had allowed themselves to be deceived by Imre Nagy. The

Chinese took just the opposite position on Poland, charging that the CPSU had prepared for military intervention in Poland and for a conference of Communist parties to condemn the Poles, and asserting that they had successfully opposed these policies. The inference was that they had prevented the CPSU from blundering.

15. The specific Chinese accusations of CPSU use of unfair methods were linked together in their most brutal accusation when they characterized the Soviet misdeeds as manifestations of "great nation chauvinism". They charged the CPSU with anti-Chinese attitudes and with expressing these in slander and smear attacks on the CPC general line, on Mao, and on the CPC leadership in their crusade against China at and after the Bucharest conference.

When the Chinese were accused of acting in collusion with the Albanians, they asked pointedly what interpretation could be placed on the fact that other delegations expressed identical views. They accused Khrushchev of making common cause with former CPC leaders who had been expelled as anti-party elements. They charged that the Soviets wished to split the Chinese people away from the CPC and that

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they had tried to undermine the whole leadership of the Chinese party. The Soviet press release of late 1959 on the Sino-India border dispute was also treated as a manifestation of this anti-Chinese attitude. The Chinese said that this release was a horrible scolding publicly administered to the Chinese, and that the Soviets had taken this anti-Chinese position to ingratiate themselves with imperialism at Chinese expense.

16. The Chinese also charged that the Soviet use of state-to-state relationships to exert pressure on the Chinese was chauvinistic. The Soviet withdrawal of technicians from China they described as a violation of treaties. They also exposed the fact that the Soviets had demanded the recall of an information officer from the Chinese embassy in Moscow, had threatened China in a Pravda article with economic blockade, had violated agreements by stopping the circulation of Chinese publications in the USSR, and had artificially created a diplomatic issue by protesting as a Chinese border encroachment the accidental presence of Chinese shepherds on Soviet territory. The Chinese also labelled as manifestations of chauvinism the Soviet charge of Chinese lack of gratitude for the

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economic and technical aid that China had received from the Soviet Union, and the contemptuous attitude the Soviets adopted in the 5 November letter to the Chinese contributions to the common cause. The Albanians again drove home the charge. Hoxha, speaking emotionally about the suspension of grain deliveries, said that "Soviet rats were eating at a time when Albanian people were starving."

17. The charges and specifications set out in the preceding paragraphs were the core of the Chinese case against the CPSU. While the evident polemic overstatements and distortions employed in the debate make it difficult to say that all the Chinese charges were true, precedent clearly supports them. The CPSU has used such methods in the past, as the case of Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates.

IV. The Soviet Reaction

18. Characteristically, the Soviet response to the Chinese case was to impugn the Chinese motives and to turn around every one of the charges and aim each of them back at the Chinese. Rejecting the accusation of great-nation chauvinism as vile and worthy only of the imperialist enemy, the CPSU charged that the Chinese sought a special

role within the international Communist movement, namely, the exclusive right to be the interpreters of Marxism-Leninism and the authority to excommunicate those who disagreed with them. The CPSU asserted that the defamation of Khrushchev was a Chinese effort to split the CPSU from the Soviet people and from the rest of the Communist world. The Soviets accused the Chinese of attacking the CPSU merely to cover up their own violations of discipline. They accused the Chinese of being pretentious and narrowly nationalist, saying, contemptuously, that such Chinese slogans as "the east wind prevails over the west wind" and "imperialism is a paper tiger" were incomprehensible and a mere juggling of geographical and meteorological language, used in place of the scientific terminology of Marxism-Leninism. They charged the Chinese with claiming false credit within the international Communist movement, and with attempts to set minorities in other Communist parties against existing leaderships. They charged them with stirring up national feeling against the Soviet Union by raising the old issues of Hungary, Poland, and the anti-Stalin campaign. And they characterized most of the Chinese charges as slander, misrepresentation.

sentation, and placing weapons in the hands of the imperialist enemy." This last charge, for example, was levelled against the Chinese because of their misrepresentation of the purposes for which the Soviet Union gave aid to the other bloc countries.

19. The truth of these Soviet charges obviously cannot be determined. But, on the basis of available evidence, it seems possible to prove that the Soviet charge that the CPC was seeking the leading role in the movement was highly exaggerated. The Chinese party and its spokesmen at Moscow never made such a claim. In fact, at the height of the recriminations in Moscow the Chinese insisted that the CPSU must assume the responsibility of leadership within the international Communist movement but not abuse this position to obtain primacy. The Chinese, moreover, have regularly expressed their willingness to consult with the CPSU and work out policies jointly. Lastly, there is the fact that all the available evidence shows that the Chinese have neither the material strength nor the organizational base for exerting systematic and effective leadership within the international Communist movement.

20. The leaders of the CPSU, on the other hand, showed by their action during October and November 1960 that they had no intention of giving up anything that they considered essential to their continued domination of the world Communist movement. They stubbornly persisted in their tactics of imposing their will on the Chinese through the device of the rule of the majority; and their manipulation of free world party delegations has been well documented. At the end of the drafting commission's deliberations on 22 October 1960, the CPSU was still insisting on the following three points which were the basis of its whole case, and the Chinese still had not given in: the condemnation of factional activity, the negating of Chinese assertions of sovereignty through criticism of national Communism, and the acknowledgment of the CPSU's hegemony through endorsement of the binding nature of the decisions of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses.

21. The Chinese were also clearly aware of the nature and purpose of the Soviet tactic of the rule of the majority. They pointed out that Khrushchev's disclaimer of the leading role of the CPSU and

his endorsement of the idea of the equality of parties was an attempt to modify only the methods of Soviet control. Specifically, the Chinese charged that Khrushchev had adopted these positions in order to make it possible for the CPSU to "punish some other parties." Confronted by this situation, the CPSU circulated, on the eve of the November meetings, a scathing attack on the CPC in the form of a letter to all delegates. We believe this procedure had the objective of crushing Chinese resistance and forcing them to accept majority rule. The CPSU held to this course through the conference session of 24 November.

V. The Chinese Case Against the CPSU's Ideological Innovations

22. During the Moscow meetings the CPSU attempted to deal with Chinese ideological arguments by impugning them as violations of discipline or as attacks upon the CPSU, but the Chinese stubbornly insisted that the meetings should consider whether the particular argument was right or wrong. Given the occasions when the Chinese took up ideological points and the concentration of their fire upon Khrushchev, it seems possible that the Soviet accusation contained an element of truth and that much of the Chinese hair-splitting argument

was their way of countering the intensity of the Soviet attack. The CPSU spokesmen showed considerable sensitivity to this Chinese gambit, and responded to the most vigorous Chinese attacks by protesting that Khrushchev had the full support of the CPSU Central Committee and that all his speeches were approved beforehand by the Presidium.

23. Both the Chinese and Soviet descriptions of their opponent's ideological views must be treated as biased. Charges of misrepresentation and slander were freely exchanged. Nevertheless, the main features of the ideological positions taken at Moscow can be defined.

24. The core of the Chinese ideological argument was that, in the absence of adequate guarantees, the application of the CPSU's ideological line would promote false hopes and illusions and commit the international Communist movement to non-revolutionary positions which it might later find untenable. The Chinese idea of what such guarantees might be were all related to their pessimistic and cautious attitude on the question of war and peace. Some of their specific views emerged in their demands for the maintenance of bloc military strength, in their

preoccupation with the necessity of the takeover of state power in additional countries, and in their criticism of Khrushchev's tendency to define peaceful policies as necessary rather than merely desirable. This led them, on virtually every point that they discussed, to criticize the CPSU and Khrushchev for placing emphasis on the wrong things.

25. On the question of the character of the current epoch, the CPC rejected as nonsense Soviet charges that the CPC considered it one of wars and revolutions, that it denied the possibility of preventing world war, and that it failed to recognize the significance of the existence and power of the Communist bloc, and accused Khrushchev of using these charges to create the impression that the danger of war comes from China.

26. On war and peace the Chinese challenged the key Khrushchev thesis that world war is not inevitable by asking, "How can one be sure?" Then they explained that their criticism of the overemphasis given by the CPSU's propaganda to the horrors of nuclear war was provoked by their concern that, if war were to break out in spite of Communist wishes, surrender sentiments might well arise within the Communist camp.

Stressing that local war in Korea and Vietnam had not led to general war, they opposed dwelling on the relationship between local and general war. They said that this was an overemphasis on the possibility of provoking general war and that it would weaken the Communist will and ability to resist both local imperialist aggression and counter-revolutionary wars.

27. On disarmament the Chinese criticized as overemphasis the CPSU formula on the possibility of achieving a "world without armies" even before the victory of socialism, saying that this would only be possible in a world without states and that drastic disarmament by the Communist bloc was manifestly unwise. The Soviets replied that their main interest was in disarming the enemy and that, even if disarmament were achieved, the defense of the bloc would be assured by the maintenance of militias. After asserting that they considered diplomatic negotiation with the enemy both desirable and useful, the Chinese insisted that the CPSU overemphasized the necessity of negotiations and thus obscured the importance of mass struggles and mass pressure. They specifically accused Khrushchev in this context

of promoting "false illusions about summit meetings." The CPSU was also relying excessively upon peaceful coexistence. Granting that it might be achieved in the future with some states, the Chinese warned that the campaign for peaceful coexistence could not be allowed to interfere with all-out support by the Communist states of revolutionary struggles.

29. On the question of the revolutionary seizure of power, the Chinese said that the CPSU was mistaken in insisting that the chances for the peaceful takeover of power were increasing, and that this mistake led the CPSU to overemphasize the whole question of peaceful takeover. They also cautioned against undue reliance upon the national bourgeois leaders of underdeveloped countries, pointing out that their dual nature could not safely be ignored and that such men as Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno were moving away from anti-imperialism, employing demagoguery and the manipulation of electoral and parliamentary processes, and using anti-Communist campaigns to consolidate their positions. The Chinese also called attention to the militarization of such regimes as proof of the need for restraint and caution in dealing with them and for avoiding hopes

and illusions which might inhibit or confuse the development of Communist campaigns of criticism and opposition, or preparations to seize power, and of readiness to repel surprise counter-revolutionary attack. As has been noted elsewhere the Chinese also criticized the Soviet denunciation of the cult of personality as having been carried too far.

29. All these criticisms and warnings of the Chinese were dramatically linked together in the charge that Khrushchev's speeches and behavior had the effect of embellishing imperialism, prettifying the bourgeois enemy, and promoting confusion and capitulationism. In commenting on the national bourgeois leaders the Chinese also insisted that nothing should be done which would prettify them.

30. In this context the Chinese came close to labelling Khrushchev a revisionist when they demanded that the general campaign against revisionism be based on the fact that it was the greatest siner in the prettifying of both imperialism and capitalism. They vigorously rejected the Soviet efforts at the conference to change the basis for struggle against revisionism with the assertion that the origins of

revisionism lay mainly in nationalism. (According to the final report of the editorial commission, the CPBU had introduced an amendment to its own draft covering this question of revisionism. It was probably in this amendment that the CPBU raised the question of the relation of revisionism and nationalism.) The Chinese obviously saw in this maneuver a Soviet attempt to pave the way for attacking their national Communism.

VI. The Soviet Reaction

31. The Soviets were clearly preoccupied with the impact of the Chinese on their entire strategy of peace. Early in the October meeting the Soviets said that acceptance of Chinese insistence on differentiating between general and local wars would "deprive the Communist movement of the banner of peace which makes it possible to rally millions the imperialists cannot rally." This was a mild restatement of the long-standing Soviet charge that the Chinese attitude toward war would, if adopted by the international Communist movement, isolate Communist parties in many countries and defeat their efforts for unity of action

with broad masses throughout the world for peace. The CPSU charged that the Chinese, in their views on the proper tactical approach to the seizure of power, rejected the idea that successful socialism could attract people to Communism.

32. Khrushchev made the same points in his last significant speech, that of 23 November. The attitude on war and peace was, he said, the measure of the seriousness of a Communist party; peace was the most important question of the epoch, and he emphasized that the CPSU's line was a highly practical solution to the problem of choosing the best way to win mass support throughout the world for the international Communist movement. Rejecting the Chinese insistence that caution should be applied in dealing with nationalist leaders who "tended to abandon anti-imperialist positions," he again emphasized that Communism could make itself attractive to the peoples of underdeveloped countries. He said the Chinese underestimated the attractiveness of the idea of peace to men like Nehru. Attraction of the people of the underdeveloped countries, he also said, was the purpose of the bloc's undertaking projects such as the Aswan dam,

which would survive the passing of individuals like Nasser and Nehru.

33. These rejections and rebuttals of Chinese views all centered in the main Soviet charge against the Chinese ideology, which was that the Chinese views on tactical policy were based on a pessimistic, cautious, and essentially negative assessment of the world situation and on an unrealistic faith in the persuasive value of revolutionary propaganda. The net result, the Soviets charged, was that the tactical programs called for by the Chinese were unattractive, would isolate Communist parties, and would destroy the chances of extending Communist influence in the free world. Further, these programs would make it possible for the imperialists rather than the international Communist movement to capitalize upon the enthusiasm in the uncommitted countries for such ideas as peace and economic aid.

VII. Assessment of the Results of the Moscow Meetings

34. Since both the Chinese and the Soviets were engaged in tactical maneuvering at the Moscow meetings, their documents and arguments cannot be treated with any confidence as accurate statements of the details of their real positions. We believe, for example, that it would be impossible to conclude from the available material, as extensive and valuable though it is, that the Soviet Union would under

no circumstances go to war or that, on the other hand, the Chinese would be likely to seek military solutions to specific problems. But certain conclusions of practical value can, we believe, be drawn safely from the available data. An important conclusion concerns the fact that virtually all the language of the 1963 statement reflects well-known Soviet positions. This fact cannot be construed as evidence of a Chinese defeat, for on 11 November, in the midst of the most bitter Chinese attack on the CPSU, the Chinese spokesman said frankly that the CPC had already made clear its agreement with virtually all aspects of CPSU policy. It is the omissions and deletions from the formal statement that are the most significant.

35. The statement does not contain certain theses which we know the CPSU tried to insert, namely, that local war is likely to lead to general war, that a world without armies can be achieved before the final victory of Communism, and that nationalism is the main source of revisionism. Other and even more significant omissions indicate that the Chinese were successful in thwarting the CPSU in its main purposes. The central fact is that the sovereignty of China and of the Communist Party of China was not compromised; the Chinese were not obliged to accept even one of the three main Soviet

demands on this point. There is no endorsement of the principle of majority rule and there is no condemnation of factionalism; national Communism is not mentioned; and the binding character of unilateral CPSU decisions for the international Communist movement is not affirmed.

36. Against the background of Khrushchev's speech to the conference on 23 November 1960, it appears significant that Khrushchev in his 6 January 1961 speech on the results of the conference made no reference to the three main Soviet positions. This 6 January 1961 speech, furthermore, was circulated in all Communist parties of the world in the January 1961 issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. (This speech is the first personal statement by Khrushchev to be published in Problems of Peace and Socialism since the inception of that magazine in mid-1958.)

VIII. The Prospects

37. Although the statement issued by the Moscow conference was adopted unanimously, Soviet and Chinese words and actions since the conference suggest that their different interpretations of the statement

and their still unresolved differences are likely to continue to generate tension and an eventual resumption of debate within the international Communist movement. More importantly, the Chinese, by evading the imposition of majority rule, may have come closer to their basic objective of obtaining status and acceptance of their views by the Soviets through systematic bilateral consultations with them. In the meantime, the Chinese will probably continue to proselytize among foreign Communist parties in order to counteract Soviet influence over the majority.

27 Feb 61